An employee at a national defense and military industrial unit, after discovering that he had disclosed details of Chinese scientific research projects while serving as a paid consultant for a foreign company, voluntarily reported the matter and rebuffed the recruitment attempt, and was therefore not held legally liable, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) unveiled the case on Monday.
The investigation was launched after state security authorities received a voluntary tip-off from a defense industry institution.
The individual who voluntarily provided the lead, surnamed Zhang, had participated in the research and development of a classified project during his doctoral studies in China, and after graduation went abroad to a university for postdoctoral research.
During his time overseas, he met a foreign national named Bu, who claimed to be a project manager at an investment consulting firm. Bu, through dinners, gifts and arranged trips, gradually built a close relationship with Zhang, repeatedly praised his academic talent, and invited him to serve as the company’s consulting advisor, promising substantial remuneration.
Seeing that the consulting assignments revolved around academic topics within his field of expertise, Zhang accepted the offer and signed a cooperation contract.
Shortly before completing his postdoctoral studies, Bu learned that Zhang would join a Chinese defense industry institute upon returning home. He then introduced Zhang to an associate surnamed Mai, purported to be the firm’s China regional lead, and sought to sustain their collaborative ties.
Thereafter, the questions from Bu and Mai gradually shifted from academic topics to Zhang’s previous research areas, even inquiries about the progress of certain classified scientific projects. Out of regard for their personal relationship and the signed agreement, Zhang disclosed some internal information he had acquired during his doctoral studies, the MSS said.
After returning to China, Zhang joined a defense industry unit. Bu and Mai remained in contact with him, seeking opportunities to pry into his work. During one casual conversation, Bu and Mai asked Zhang about the progress of research on core components of a certain piece of equipment, arousing suspicion in Zhang. He immediately changed the topic and brought the conversation to an early end.
Having received repeated counter‑espionage training at his unit, Zhang began to suspect their true identities and intentions, and hoped to end the cooperation through passive non-cooperation. Bu and Mai nonetheless kept reassuring and persuading him to continue cooperating, yet Zhang held firm in his refusal, forcing the pair to back off and sever all contact with him.
During a routine one-on-one discussion organized by his unit, Zhang voluntarily reported this experience to his employer. After obtaining the leads, the state security authorities launched an investigation and confirmed that both Bu and Mai were operatives of an overseas intelligence service.
The overseas intelligence service, impressed by Zhang’s academic competence and prospects, had identified him as a recruitment target from the moment he arrived abroad, and gradually wooed him under the pretext of a consultancy arrangement, said the MSS.
In view of the fact that Zhang voluntarily reported the matter, was unaware of the true identities of the other parties while overseas, and cut off contact upon noticing suspicious signs, and the internal information he disclosed had not caused serious harm, the national security authorities decided not to pursue legal action against him, the MSS said.
Global Times
